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THE FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
AFTER 15 YEARS*
L. HAROLD LEVINSON**

A

LMOST every aspect of the new Florida Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was innovative and bold in 1974.' Today, when
we commemorate its fifteenth birthday, the basic features introduced
in 1974 remain in place, although the Act has gone through numerous
amendments since then.
This Essay starts by placing the Act in the context of prior Florida
law and the law of other jurisdictions. The remainder of the Essay
reflects on some issues raised by current proposals to amend or reinterpret the Act: rule review, required rulemaking, the draw-out, and
the subject-matter index of orders.
I.

THE FLORIDA

APA IN

CONTEXT

Florida was a fruitful place in the 1970's for innovative developments in administrative procedure. The state was experiencing rapid
population growth, diversification of the economy, and political realignment that made Florida remarkably open to new ideas. In this climate, the Florida Law Revision Council embarked on a project to
draft a new Florida Administrative Procedure Act and retained Arthur England as Reporter. 2 At a crucial stage of the project, some
members of the Council accompanied England on a weekend visit to
Washington to brainstorm with some national experts on the features
that should be included in a state-of-the-art revision of the 1961 Florida APA.

* Copyright, 1991, L. Harold Levinson. This Essay expands upon remarks made at the
Seventh Florida Administrative Law Conference at Tallahassee in March 1990.
*
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; B.B.A., 1957; LL.B., 1962, University of Mian; LL.M., 1964, New York University; J.S.D., 1974, Columbia University.
1. See, e.g., Kennedy, A National Perspective ofAdministrative Law and the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 65 (1975). For an in-depth discussion of selected features of the Act, see Symposium, The New Florida Administrative Procedure Act:
Selected Presentations from the Attorney General's Conference, 3 FiA. ST. U.L. REv. 64 (1975);
Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 965 (1986).
2. The history of the 1974 Florida APA is traced in Levinson, The Florida Administrative
Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 1975 Amendments, 29 U. MLAu L. Ray. 617, 621 (1975).
3. Ch. 61-280, 1961 Fla. Laws 538.
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The ideas generated in this weekend session, combined with the existing expertise of the Florida participants and enriched by later input
from other sources in the state, culminated in the first draft of the
1974 Florida APA. The eclectic and cosmopolitan nature of the drafting process produced an Act that has well served a growing and diverse state and also has provided significant guidance on the national
scene.
A.

The RelationshipBetween the 1974 FloridaAPA and Prior
FloridaLaw

In 1975, I identified the following features as the major accomplish4
ments of the 1974 Florida APA:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

the expanded range of agencies and functions covered by the
Act;5
the requirement of model rules of procedure, to be adopted
6
by the Administration Commission;
the "draw-out"-an adjudicative hearing during a pending
7
rulemaking proceeding;
the creation of the Division of Administrative Hearings
(DOAH), a central panel of hearing officers;'
a provision for DOAH's review of proposed or existing
rules; 9
creation of the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee
(JAPC), a legislative committee; 0
Joint Committee review of proposed rules;"
public access to rules, orders, and a subject-matter index of
each; 12
the availability of declaratory statements from agencies; 3
a requirement that agencies follow their own adjudicative
4
precedents or give a satisfactory reason for the departure;

4. Levinson, supra note 2, at 695-99 (summarizing highlights of the Act discussed earlier in
the same article).
5. Id. at 622-31; FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50, 120.52 (1989).
6. Levinson, supra note 2, at 631-34; FLA. STAT. § 120.54(10) (1989).
7. Levinson, supra note 2, at 639, 656; FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1989).
8. Levinson, supra note 2, at 671-74; FLA. STAT. § 120.65 (1989).
9. Levinson, supra note 2, at 639-41, 648-49; FLA. STAT. § 120.54(4), .56 (1989).
10. Levinson, supra note 2, at 693; FLA. STAT. § 11.60 (1989).
11. Levinson, supra note 2, at 641-42; FLA. STAT. § 120.545 (1989).
12. Levinson, supra note 2, at 645-46; FtA. STAT. § 120.53(2) (1989).
13. Levinson, supra note 2, at 648; FLA. STAT. § 120.565 (1989).
14. Levinson, supra note 2, at 650-51; FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12) (1989).
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the right to an adjudicative proceeding whenever an agency
determines or affects a person's substantial interests;"
creation of an informal adjudicative proceeding, to be used
when no disputed issue of material fact is involved;' 6
a general requirement that DOAH assign hearing officers to
7
preside at formal adjudicative proceedings;
admissibility of evidence in accordance with the "reasonably
prudent person" test;"
participation in formal adjudicative proceedings by nonparties; 19
a time limit for rendition of the final order; 20
a requirement for prompt disposition of licensing proceed2
ings; 1
a prohibition against ex parte communications and remedies
if such communications take place;"
a single form of action and single scope of review for judicial review in the district court of appeal, except when the
circuit court renders declaratory judgments or exercises jurisdiction conferred by other statutes;" and
circuit court enforcement of agency action upon petition by
an agency or, in some circumstances, by any substantially
interested person. 24

The people who put together this package of innovations in the
1974 Florida APA intended to achieve radical improvements in the
fairness of the administrative process. In many respects we wanted to
make a clear break with prior Florida law. For example, the Reporter's Comments 2l document our intent to overrule the result in the Bay
NationalBank 26 case, discussed later in this Essay.

15. Levinson, supra note 2, at 656-58; FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1989).
16. Levinson, supra note 2, at 663-68; FLA. STAT. § 120.57(2) (1989).
17. Levinson, supra note 2, at 659-60; FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(a) (1989).
18. Levinson, supra note 2, at 651; FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(a) (1989).
19. Levinson, supra note 2, at 662; FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(b)(4) (1989).
20. Levinson, supra note 2, at 653-54; FLA. STAT. § 120.59(1) (1989).
21. Levinson, supra note 2, at 670; FiA. STAT. § 120.60 (1989).
22. Levinson, supra note 2, at 674-78; FA. STAT. § 120.66 (1989).
23. Levinson, supra note 2, at 678-83; FA. STAT. § 120.68, .73 (1989).
24. Levinson, supra note 2, at 689-93; FA. STAT. § 120.69 (1989).
25. Reporter's Comments on Proposed Administrative Procedure Act for the State of Florida, March 9, 1974, reprinted in 3 A. ENGLAND & L. LEvINSON, FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PRLACTICE MANUAL (1979) [hereinafter Reporter's Comments].
26. Bay Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. v. Dickinson, 229 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969), cited
with approval in Dickinson v. Judges of the Dist. Court of Appeal, 282 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1973).
The Bay Natl'l Bank decision is discussed infra, text accompanying notes 101-03.
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In other respects, however, we preserved many pre-1974 concepts.
Perhaps the most important point, in this connection, is that we preserved the basic distinction between rulemaking and adjudication.
This distinction is fundamental to the structure of the 1974 Act, which
deals quite separately with rulemaking and adjudication regarding
27
procedure, presiding officer, publication, and binding effect.
The concept of adjudication pervades the 1974 Act although the
word itself is conspicuously absent, having been replaced by the
phrase "agency determination of substantial interests." This change
in terminology signifies the drafters' intent to reject judicial precedents, particularly the Bay National Bank decision, which had interpreted the term "adjudication" under prior law. 29
The 1974 APA is linked to prior Florida law in another important
respect. The 1972 revision of article V, the judiciary article of the
Florida Constitution, provided a strong foundation for the APA by
authorizing the Legislature to confer quasi-judicial powers upon agencies and provide for judicial review of agency action.30 This constitutional support facilitated some of the most significant innovations in
the 1974 APA.
B.

RelationshipBetween FloridaAPA and Laws of Other States

The 1974 Florida APA drew upon the prior law of other states to
some extent. The basic distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is found, not only in the 1961 Florida APA, 3' but also in the
federal APA, 32 the 1961 Model State APA, 33 and the APA's of other

27. The distinction is relaxed only slightly by the requirement, in narrowly defined circumstances, of an adjudicative-type proceeding, generally called the "draw-out," during a pending
rulemaking proceeding, supra note 6, discussed infra text accompanying notes 96-112.
28. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1989). This term replaces § 120.22 of the 1961 Florida APA.
29. Levinson, supra note 2, at 628.
30. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 1 (commissions may be granted quasi-judicial powers); id. §
3(b)(7) (supreme court may directly review administrative action, as prescribed by general law);
id. § 4(b)(2) (similar provision regarding district courts of appeal); id. § 5(b) (similar provision
regarding circuit courts).
31. The 1961 Florida APA, FLA. STAT. ch. 120, was created by chapter 61-280, 1961 Fla.
Laws 538 to replace former chapter 120, General Provisions Relating to Boards, Commissions,
Etc. The 1961 Florida Act consisted of three parts, dealing respectively with rulemaking, adjudication, and judicial review. Evans, Procedural Due Process: Florida's Uniform Administrative
Procedure Act, 21 U. MIAMI L. R v. 145, 145-46, n.5 (1966).
32. The Federal APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1988), deals separately with rulemaking, id. §
553, and adjudication, id. § 554.
33. The 1961 Model State APA, 15 U.L.A. 147 (1990), deals separately with rulemaking, §
3, and contested cases, § 9. The comment to the definitional section of this Act explains the
terminology as follows:
The term "contested case" is used in the Model Act, instead of the word "adjudica-
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states.34 The central panel of hearing officers, known in Florida as the
Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), was adapted from the
California Office of Administrative Hearings. 3 The Reporter's Comments make a number of references to the APA's of Massachusetts,
Oregon and Texas, in connection with various features of the Florida
Act. 36 The elaborate system of legislative oversight was apparently derived from contacts between Florida legislators and their counterparts
in other states who had developed similar systems.17 Finally, national
and local experts contributed a wide variety of ideas, some based directly on existing statutes or pending legislative proposals in various
states, others based on the experts' speculations as to the features that
should be incorporated in a state-of-the-art APA1 s
Having benefited from the prior law of other states, the 1974 Florida APA in turn exerted significant influence on subsequent developments in other states. This influence is seen most clearly in the 1981
revision of the Model State APA.3 9 The 1974 Florida Act, sometimes
tion" as found in the Federal Act, to avoid the possible confusion in terminology that
might result from the fact that ratemaking under the Federal Act is classified as "rule
making" with special procedures applicable to it, whereas under the Model Act it is
desired to apply the contested case procedures to ratemaking.
1961 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, § l(2)(d), Comment, in 15 U.L.A. 147, 149.
34. See A. BONFILD & M. Asnmow, STATE AND FEDERAL ADmSTRATrE LAW 256 (1989)
("Despite criticisms of the rulemaking-adjudication dichotomy as a basis for assigning procedures to govern agency action, and alternative proposals for more functional procedural
schemes, the dichotomy has survived as a major feature of contemporary administrative law.").
35. Reporter's Comments, supra note 25, at 22.
36. Id. at 8 (listing short-form citations for the APA's of these states, to facilitate the numerous references to them throughout the Reporter's Comments).
37. The National Conference of State Legislatures provided an effective forum for the sharing of experiences regarding legislative oversight of agency rulemaking; see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEOISLATURES, LEGISLATIVE IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION COMMITTEE,
RESTORINo THE BALANCE-LEoISLATVE RE TEW OF ADMINISTRATrVE REGULATIONS (1978). For a
summary of the earlier history of legislative oversight, see 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 224-30 (1965).

38. Some similarities can be found between the 1974 Florida APA and the statutes enacted
in other states at about the same time. For example, an informal adjudicative hearing with some
similarity to that provided by the 1974 Florida APA, see supra text accompanying note 16, has
been part of the Virginia APA since the 1975 revision, Va. Code § 9-6.14:11 (1989). As another
example, the right to an adjudicative hearing when an agency determines the substantial interests
of a person, along the lines of the right guaranteed by the 1974 Florida APA, see supra text
accompanying note 15, has been part of the Wisconsin APA since 1975, Wis. Stat. Ann. §
227.42 (Supp. 1989); see Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Natural Resources, 126 Wis. 2d 63, 375 N.W.2d 648 (Wis. 1985) (APA guarantees hearing to local sewerage
district, to challenge state agency's order to install expensive concrete lining in proposed deep
tunnel sewer).
39. The comments to the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 15 U.L.A. 7
(1990) [hereinafter 1981 MSAPA] include numerous references to APA's of various states,
among which Florida features prominently. The two Reporters for the 1981 MSAPA were Professor Arthur Bonfield and myself. During the drafting of the 1981 MSAPA, I frequently turned
to the Florida APA as a source of ideas.
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in conjunction with APA's of other states, had an impact on numerous 1981 Model Act provisions, including the following:
* conversion of proceedings from one type to another; 40
* indexing of agency orders; 4 '
* required adoption of model rules of procedure; 42
* the APA as a source of the right to an adjudicative hear43
ing;
* the requirement of prompt agency processing of applications;"
* the creation of multiple models of the adjudicative process
45
with varying levels of formality;
* participation in adjudicative proceedings by non-parties;4
* adjudicative fact-finding based on evidence that would sat47
isfy a reasonably prudent person;
* the central panel of hearing officers;"
* the unitary system of judicial review of all types of agency
49

action;
* judicial review in an appellate court;5 0
* the scope of judicial review;" and
* enforcement of agency action.5 2
40. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 1-107. For Florida APA equivalents, see FLA. STAT. §
120.54(17) (1989) (draw-out), and Levinson, supra note 2, at 666, n.284 (conversion from informal adjudication to formal adjudication, implied by FLA. STAT. § 120.57).
41. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 2-102; Florida APA equivalent, FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)
(1989).
42. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 2-105; Florida APA equivalent, FLA. STAT. § 120.54(10)
(1989).
43. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 1-102(5), 4-101, 4-102; Florida APA equivalent, FLA.
STAT. § 120.57 (1989).
44. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 4-104; Florida APA equivalent, FLA. STAT. § 120.60
(1989).
45. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 4-201 to 4-506; Florida APA equivalent, FLA. STAT. §
120.57(2) (1989).
46. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 4-211(3); Florida APA equivalent, FLA. STAT. §
120.57(1)(b)(4) (1989).
47. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 4-215(d); Florida APA analogy, FLA. STAT. §
120.58(l)(a) (1989). The Florida Act uses this standard for admissibility of evidence, not for the
basis of a fact finding.
48. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, §§ 4-301, 4-202(a); Florida APA equivalent, FLA. STAT. §
120.65 (1989).
49. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 5-105; Florida APA equivalent, FLA. STAT. §§ 120.68,
.73 (1989).
50. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 5-104, Alt. B; Florida APA equivalent, FLA. STAT. §
120.68 (1989).
51.
1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 5-116; Florida APA equivalent, FLA. STAT. § 120.68
(1989).
52. 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, §§ 5-201 to 5-205; Florida APA equivalent, FLA. STAT. §
120.69 (1989).
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The Florida APA has been heavily litigated. 53 When no Florida judicial precedent is directly on point, cases from other jurisdictions can
provide helpful guidance on interpreting the Florida Act, especially if
the APA's of those jurisdictions contain provisions similar to those of
the Florida Act on the topic under consideration. Even if the APA
wording is not the same, out-of-state cases may still be useful, especially if they address the common law of administrative procedure,
such as the basic differences between rulemaking and adjudication.
II.

RuLE REvIEw

An agency faces six major obstacles during and after the rulemaking process. First, the agency must allow interested persons to present
evidence and argument during the regular rulemaking proceedings.Second, a person may request a draw-out hearing." Third, a person
may ask DOAH to determine the validity of a proposed rule."
Fourth, a person may ask DOAH to determine the validity of an existing rule. 7 Fifth, the Joint Committee conducts its legislative review
process. Finally, the rule is subject to judicial review.' 9
These are all excellent safeguards, but they may not all be necessary. The Reporter's draft of the Law Revision Council bill did not
include all of these safeguards. Some of them were in the Reporter's
draft and were adopted by the House bill. A completely separate set
of controls was included in the Senate bill. The two bills were basically fused together in what became the 1974 APA6 While this may
have been an expedient way of getting the statute enacted, it gave
Florida one of the nation's most cumbersome systems of rulemaking
and rule review.
Two of today's symposium speakers propose to add further burdens to the system by requiring agency rulemaking in a broader range
62
of situations, 6' and by making the draw-out more readily available.
Both proposals would impose new burdens on the agencies and on

53.
(1982 &
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

The sheer bulk of the annotations to the Florida APA, in 7B FLA.
1990 Supp.), indicates the high level of litigation.
FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3) (1989).
Id. § 120.54(17) (1989).
Id. § 120.54(4) (1989).
Id. § 120.56 (1989).
Id. § 120.545 (1989).

STAT. ANN. §

120

59. Id. § 120.68 (1989).
60. Levinson, supra note 2, at 622.
61. Bonfield, The Quest for an Ideal State Administrative Rulemaking Procedure, 18 FiA.
ST. U.L. REv. 617 (1991).
62. Maher, We're No Angels: Rulemaking and JudicialReview in Florida, 18 FiA. ST. U.L.
REv. 873 (1991).
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citizen participants in the rulemaking process.6 3 In addition, the first
proposal would increase the workload of the Joint Committee, and
both proposals would increase the workload of DOAH. I am concerned that the imposition of these extra burdens could seriously and
needlessly endanger the system.
Before commenting on each of these proposals, I will discuss the
existing burdens on the Joint Committee and DOAH, and will suggest
ways to relieve rather than increase these burdens.
A.

Joint Committee Review of Rules

The 1974 APA created the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee, known generally as the Joint Committee or JAPC.64 The Joint
Committee consists of three members of the Senate appointed by the
Senate President and three members of the House appointed by the
House Speaker.65 The Joint Committee reviews all proposed rules and
may also review existing rules."6 If the Joint Committee finds a proposed or existing rule questionable, the agency has an opportunity to
present argument and evidence in support of its position. 67 If not convinced by the agency, the Joint Committee gives public notice of its
objections." These objections, however, do not deprive the rule of legal effect, because the APA confers only advisory powers upon the
Joint Committee. 9
The Joint Committee has done an outstanding job, thanks to the
dedication of its staff, its director, and the legislators who have served
on the committee. The report for calendar year 1989 shows that the
Joint Committee reviewed 4,865 rules and filed twenty-four formal
objections. 70 This small number of objections does not reflect the full
measure of the Joint Committee's effect on the rulemaking process.
Many additional concerns were resolved informally. Further, I believe
the very existence of the committee and agency awareness of the committee's review process provide additional assurance of a high-quality
rulemaking process.

63.
64.
see."

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
August

See discussion in text accompanying notes 91-112, infra.
FLA. STAT. §§ 11.60, 120.545 (1989). The acronym JAPC is generally pronounced "jap-

Id. § 11.60(1).
Id. § 120.545(1).
Id. § 120.545(2), .545(3), .545(4), .545(5).
Id. § 120.545(8).
Id.
JOINT ADIm. PROC. Comm., Rule Statistics for 1985 Through 1990 (reports run on
24, 1990) (on file at Florida State Archives).
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I cannot help wondering, however, how much longer the Joint
Committee and its staff will be able to carry this rule review workload, even at its present volume. Additionally, the volume will increase if agencies are required to promulgate a significantly larger
number of rules than they do now. If the workload becomes too much
for the Joint Committee to handle, part or all of the rule review function may have to shift to the executive branch.
In a growing number of states, the executive branch is involved, in
one way or another, in the function of overseeing rules.7 ' In some
states, this oversight simply means that no rule can become effective
without the signature of the Governor. 72 In another group of states,
rules become effective without the Governor's signature, but the Governor can veto any rule at any time. 7 Either of these systems can be
elaborated by requiring an executive agency to assist the Governor by
reviewing all proposed or existing rules.7 4 For example, California has
established an executive-branch agency, the Office of Administrative
Law, to conduct routine rule review. 7 This agency may disapprove
proposed rules, but the Governor may reverse its decisions. In one of
his first acts after taking office, President Reagan issued an executive
order creating a federal system of executive-branch rule oversight that
is clearly derived from the system Mr. Reagan experienced as Gover76
nor of California.
Further variations are possible, depending on whether the executive
agency merely advises the Governor or is empowered to render an initial order subject to the Governor's review. 77 Still another possibility is
the creation of a nonbinding system of executive-branch review, in
which neither the Governor nor any executive agency has the power to
approve or veto rules; this system would effectively create in an execu-

71. See A. BoNsLD & M. Asimow, supra note 34, at 502-08; see generally Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 WM.
& MARY L. Rv. 79 (1982).
72. A. BoNm'Ia & M. Asimow, supra note 34, at 503.
73. Id. This approach is taken in the 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, § 3-202.
74. The 1981 MSAPA, supra note 39, establishes an administrative rules counsel to advise
the Governor, id. § 3-202(c), but the Act does not require this counsel or the Governor to conform to any particular system of rule review. In contrast, the California Act creates an executive
agency and requires it to follow a certain system. CAL. GovT. CODE §§ 11340.1-.2, 11349.1-.6
(West Supp. 1990).
75. A. BoN~rEsr & M. Astmow, supra note 34, at 504-05.
76. Id. at 506, 325-27.
77. The 1981 MSAPA vests only advisory functions in the administrative rules counsel, see
supra note 74. The California Act empowers the Office of Administrative Law to take initial
action, subject to reversal by the Governor. CAL. GovT. CODE §§ 11349.1, .3, .5 (West Supp.

1990).
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tive agency the same type of advisory review now performed in Florida by the Joint Committee.
The emerging emphasis on executive oversight results, in part, from
a number of state court decisions holding the legislative veto unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers. 78 These decisions
have no direct bearing on the situation in Florida because the Joint
Committee serves in an advisory capacity and therefore does not encroach on the power of the executive branch. Another reason for the
increasing popularity of executive oversight is quite relevant in Florida-the perceived need to relieve part-time legislators of the additional burden of rule review.
Under any system of executive oversight, the Legislature can still
exercise its own review by looking over the shoulders of the executive
oversight agency. Thus, in Florida, if an executive agency took over
the routine tasks of the existing oversight function, the Joint Committee could selectively review the work of that executive oversight
agency.
The task of designing an acceptable system of executive oversight of
rules would be especially difficult in Florida because of the fragmented structure of the executive branch of government. 79 That
branch is headed by a Governor elected on a ticket with a Lieutenant
Governor, but other independently elected officers also serve as the
Cabinet and share in the exercise of executive power, as prescribed by
the Florida Constitution.8° The Florida APA allocates various functions to various components of the executive branch of government.
For example, the Administration Commission (a Cabinet agency)
adopts model rules of procedure, allows agencies to modify these
rules, and confers exemptions from any requirements of the Act. 8 '
The Department of State handles the publication of rules, 82 the Department of Administration provides administrative support for
DOAH, 3 and the Governor appoints individuals to serve as substitutes following the disqualification of an elected agency head.84 If the
Legislature decided to place the function of rule review in the executive branch, the question of where to locate it would require serious
consideration.
78. A. BoNPIz, STATE AmnmsTRjTrvE RuLe MAKING 497-501 (1986). But see Mead v.
Arnell, 791 P.2d 410 (Idaho 1990) (two-house veto system does not violate Idaho separation of
powers).
79. FLA. CONST., art. IV.
80. Id., §§ 1, 2, 4-5.
81. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(10), 120.63 (1989).
82. Id. § 120.55 (1989).
83. Id. § 120.65(1).
84. Id. § 120.71(1).
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I do not suggest an immediate transfer of rule review from the Joint
Committee to an executive agency; we should, however, keep the possibility in mind as an option that may become more attractive if the
Joint Committee experiences an increase in its workload or a decrease
in its capacity to handle the existing volume of rule review.
B.

DOAH Review of Rules

The 1974 APA created the Division of Administrative Hearings
(DOAH) to provide a central panel of hearing officers.8" DOAH hearing officers spend most of their time presiding over formal adjudicative hearings, but DOAH has an additional function under the APA:
review of the validity of proposed rules and existing rules.8 In rule
review matters, the decision of the DOAH hearing officer is subject
87
only to judicial review.
The Florida system of rule review by DOAH is unique.88 I do not
criticize the system on that account, because I have always admired
the spirit of innovation in this state. I cannot help noticing, however,
that other states have seen no need to adopt similar systems. Apparently, legislators in other states are satisfied that their systems of legislative or executive oversight and judicial review provide adequate
controls over agency rulemaking.
In 1989, DOAH's total case load was 7,194 cases.8 9 Of these, 193
were rule challenge cases, consisting of 119 challenges to proposed
rules, 72 challenges to existing rules, and 2 challenges to combinations
of proposed and existing rules.9 The small percentage of challenges
may itself reflect the high effectiveness of the rule review function,
because the availability of rule review is likely to encourage agencies
to draft their rules with extra care.
III.

REQUIRED RULEMAKING

Under a proposal, considered but not passed by the 1990 Legislature, the Legislature would express its preference that agencies develop policy by rulemaking and even provide for sanctions if an
85. Levinson, supra note 2, at 671-74; FLA. STAT. § 120.65 (1989).
86. Levinson, supra note 2, at 639-41, 648-49; FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(4), .56 (1989).
87. This result is accomplished by designating the hearing officer's decision as "final
agency action." See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(4)(d), .56(5) (1989).
88. A system that was similar in some respects was held unconstitutional as a violation of
the separation of powers in State Tax Comm'n. v. Administrative Hearing Comm'n., 641
S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1982).
89. Letter to author from Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, Feb. 12, 1990, summarizing case statistics for 1989 (on file at Florida State Archives).
90. Id.
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agency failed to do so. 9' In order to evaluate the practicality of this
proposal, we should at least obtain an estimate of how many more
rules agencies would have to promulgate under the proposed regime.
If only several hundred more rules would be promulgated each year,
the proposal could be practical; on the other hand, the proposal
would be totally impractical if thousands of new rules had to be processed each year. A large increase in the volume of rulemaking would
not only burden the agencies themselves, it would also have a serious
impact on the rule review work of the Joint Committee and would
increase the potential number of rule challenge cases in DOAH's
docket.
One of the attractive features of required rulemaking is its potential
for reducing the volume or complexity of future adjudication. This
result may be anticipated because an increase in the use of rulemaking
may clarify an agency's interpretations and policies, and may consequently reduce the risk of disagreement when the agency applies these
rules in specific situations. I believe the case for required rulemaking
would be strengthened if a cost/benefit analysis projected that the
costs of required rulemaking would be significantly offset by the benefits of reduced volume or complexity of adjudicative proceedings. In
the absence of any analysis along these lines, I seriously doubt that
required rulemaking would indeed be cost-effective.
Instead of imposing an across-the-board rulemaking requirement
encompassing all agencies and all programs, the Legislature should
consider imposing the requirement selectively on specific agencies regarding specific programs, where past agency performance indicates a
special need for more extensive rulemaking. In addition, the Legislature can address the problem by crafting enabling acts with the maximum feasible specificity, so as to reduce the need for policy-making
when agencies implement the statutes .92
Even when agencies make policy during adjudicative proceedings,
significant safeguards are available under the Florida APA, as interpreted in McDonald v. Department of Banking & Finance.93 If the
staff of an agency intends to use an adjudicated case as a vehicle for
developing new policy, the staff must put the proposed "incipient policy" into issue during the adjudicative hearing so that all parties will
have an opportunity to address it. The policy issue must then be re-

91. Fla. H.B. 2539, §§ 1, 3 (1990).
92. Statutes may vest considerable discretion in an administrative agency so long as they
meet a threshold requirement of specificity. See Askew v. Cross Keys Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913
(Fla. 1978). Evidently, a higher level of specificity would be needed in order to minimize the
need for agencies to make policy when implementing the statute.
93. 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
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solved by the hearing officer, subject to review by the agency head
and appellate review by the courts. The policy decision in each case
becomes part of the body of precedent, which should be accessible to
the public through the subject-matter index. 94 This precedent will be
persuasive in future cases, under the theory of administrative stare decisis, 95 and may provide sufficient guidance to agency staff and affected persons to satisfy the concerns of those who advocate increased
use of rulemaking.

IV.

DRAW-OUT

The "draw-out" provision of the 1974 Florida APA requires that
an agency suspend a pending rulemaking proceeding and convene an
adjudicative proceeding if a person "timely asserts that his substantial
interests will be affected in the proceeding and affirmatively demonstrates that the [rulemaking] proceeding does not provide adequate
opportunity to protect those interests."9
I am concerned about Professor Maher's proposal to make the
draw-out more readily available.Y If carried to an extreme, this proposal could convert rulemaking into an adjudicative process at the will
of anybody who wants it to become one. This approach would impose
on the rulemaking process an intolerable burden that was not intended
by the drafters of the 1974 Act."
In my mind, the "draw-out" provision does not eliminate the traditional distinction between rulemaking and adjudication. The drafters
built upon a foundation laid by some of the classic decisions of the
United States Supreme Court that guarantee at least a rudimentary
type of adjudicative hearing to a person whose interests are affected in
an individualized way by agency action." The draw-out provides for

94.
95.

Levinson, supranote 2, at 645-46; FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c) (1989).
Levinson, supranote 2, at 650-51; FLA. STAT. § 120.68(12) (1989).
96. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(17) (1989).
97. Maher, supra note 62, at text accompanying notes 176-96.
98. The accompanying text reflects the opinion I personally held during the drafting of the
1974 Florida APA, and have continued to hold since then. To the best of my knowledge and
recollection, my opinion on this issue was shared by the other drafters. I was aware that the
federal APA allows for adjudicative hearings during rulemaking if required by another statute. I
also knew about some of the situations in which federal agencies had to conduct such hearings,
including the 214-day hearing to determine the permissible ingredients of ice cream, or the fourmonth hearing to fix a general standard for the ingredients of peanut butter. See W. GELLHORN
& C. BysE, AbmuIsTRATv LAw CAsEs AND Co mNrrs 733-34 (6th ed. 1974). I did not intend
to impose this type of burden on Florida agencies.
99. The classic cases are Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (rudimentary hearing is
constitutionally required for individualized determinations), and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v.
Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (hearing not required for across-the-board regulation). During
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an adjudicative process, not only in the situations where the Supreme
Court precedents require it, but also in a slightly broader range of
circumstances, which the drafters tried to capture in the words of the
APA.
Significantly, the language triggering the right to a draw-out is the
same language that is in APA section 120.57 triggering the general
right to an adjudicative proceeding.'00 In either situation, the right to
an adjudicative hearing arises when an agency determines a person's
substantial interests. The use of the same statutory language in each
provision indicates a legislative intent to apply similar standards in
both situations. The draw-out provision therefore derives meaning
from the purpose underlying section 120.57.
That purpose was to protect a person whose individualized, substantial interests were determined, even if nb other statute or constitutional provision guaranteed the right to a hearing. In order to achieve
this result, the drafters expressed their intent to overrule prior case
law, notably the 1969 decision in Bay National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Dickinson.l0 That case arose from the denial of a banking license.
Applying the 1961 Florida APA, the Bay National court held that the
Comptroller did not adjudicate any party's rights, duties, privileges,
or immunities when he exercised his statutory function of passing
upon an application for a bank charter. Consequently, the court held
that the Comptroller's action was not an "order" subject to the APA,
but was instead a "quasi-executive" function.
Bay National reflected the traditional view that a license applicant
did not have the right to a hearing. 10 2 In contrast, the traditional view
recognized that a licensee threatened with suspension or revocation
did have a constitutionally guaranteed right to a hearing, except in

the drafting of the Florida APA, the interplay between these two cases was repeated with approval in United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973). At that time, legal
thinking about the constitutional right to a hearing was dominated by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process requires that pretermination evidentiary
hearing be held when public assistance payments to welfare recipient are discontinued). Florida
East Coast was later elaborated by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), while Goldberg was clarified by a number of cases,
including Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
100. Levinson, supra note 2, at 639, 656-58; FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(17), .57 (1989).
101. 229 So. 2d 302 (1969).
102. In reaching this conclusion, the Bay Nationalcourt characterized the agency's function,
in passing upon a license application, as "a quasi-executive or quasi-legislative function in which
legal rights, duties, privileges, or immunities are not the subject of adjudication." 229 So. 2d at
306. A vestige of the Bay National view survives, unfortunately, in Metsch v. University of
Florida, 550 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (APA hearing is not available to an unsuccessful
applicant for admission to state law school). This decision takes a position which, I thought, had
been superseded by the 1974 APA.
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emergency situations. 103 This traditional distinction between applicants
and licensees continues to find expression in judicial interpretations of
due process; the courts continue to guarantee fewer procedural rights
to applicants than to incumbents.'04
The drafters of section 120.57 of the 1974 Florida APA intended to
give a broader range of procedural protections than those mandated
by the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions, and to
afford these protections to applicants as well as to incumbents. 0 5 In
addition to clarifying the matter of incipient policymaking, the McDonald case'06 also recognizes that the 1974 APA guarantees an adjudicative hearing to a bank charter applicant.' 7
The adjudicative hearing guaranteed by the 1974 Florida APA may
be either formal or informal, depending on whether or not a disputed
issue of material fact is involved?08 By providing for informal as well
as formal hearings, the drafters intended to protect the agency from
being clogged by needless formalities.'°9
This discussion of section 120.57 may help explain the purpose of
the similarly-worded draw-out provision. While section 120.57 guarantees a hearing even though the subject matter may be regarded as a
"privilege" rather than a "right" under the traditional view, 110 the
draw-out provision guarantees an adjudicative process even though
the result of the agency action may be characterized as a "rule" rather
than an "order" under the traditional usages of these terms. The
hearing, however, is available only when the agency determines "substantial interests.""' This term indicates a legislative intent to extend
the guarantee of a hearing beyond the traditional limits, while at the
same time establishing a new set of limits that is developed over time
by agency practice and case law. As a final word about the draw-out,
I should mention that a draw-out proceeding may be conducted as
either formal or informal adjudication, under the provisions of sec-

103. See, e.g., Keating v. State, 173 So. 2d 673, 677 (Fla. 1965) (due process guarantees
notice and an opportunity for an adjudicative hearing before an agency may suspend or revoke a
liquor license).
104. See, e.g., Walters v. National Ass'n. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 n.8
(1985) (holding that Supreme Court precedents guarantee a hearing before an existing flow of
benefits can be cut off, but no Supreme Court precedent guarantees a hearing to an applicant for
benefits).
105. Reporter's Comments, supra note 25, at 18.
106. 346 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
107. Id. at 578.
108. FLA. STAT. § 120.57 (1989).
109. Reporter's Comments, supra note 25, at 19.
110. See notes 101-107, supra, and accompanying text.
111. Levinson, supra note 2, at 639, 656-58; FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(17), .57 (1989).
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tion 120.57, depending on whether or not the matter involves a dis2
puted issue of material fact."
V.

SUBJECT MATTER INDEX OF AGENCY ORDERS

No matter how many rules the agencies adopt, citizens will still need
access to a subject matter index of orders. The Florida Act requires
each agency to prepare a subject matter index of its orders and to
make this index available to the public." 3 The purpose is to protect

citizens against arbitrariness, to give citizens the means of finding out
whether they are receiving treatment equal to similarly situated persons, and to give the courts the opportunity to determine whether the
agency is acting arbitrarily or evenhandedly.
Having discovered, to my great dismay, that the indexing require-

ment is not being faithfully carried out," 4 I encourage concerned persons to invoke the enforcement mechanism provided by the APA
itself. Section 120.54(5) requires the agency to furnish all information
called for by section 120.53, within thirty days or explain why it is not
furnishing the information." 1' The Reporter's Comments to the APA

note that citizens may invoke Section 120.54(5) as a basis for requesting an agency to provide access to its index because section 120.53
requires the agency to give this information."16 If the agency fails to

provide an index, a party may seek judicial review of the agency's
action." 7 In this litigation the agency will have to explain its failure to
comply with the statutory requirement of maintaining an index.

As a technical matter, indexing is probably much easier now than it
was in 1974 when this statute was written because computers and data
processing are much more advanced. An appropriate state agency,
perhaps the Administration Commission through the Model Rules,"

112. FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(17), .57 (1989).
113. FLA. STAT. § 120.53(2)(c) (1989). In December 1989, the Administrative Conference of
the United States noted that some federal agencies have failed to comply with the indexing requirements established by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2). The Conference made a series of recommendations for more effective implementation of the indexing
requirements, including use of computer technology. Recommendation 89-8, Agency Practices
and Procedures for the Indexing and Public Availability of Adjudicatory Decisions, I C.F.R. §
305.89-8 (1990).
114. See studies prepared for this Conference, including STAFF OF FLA. SEN. COMM. ON
GovTL. OPs., A SUPPLEMENT TO A REVIEW OF INDEXING OF AGENCY ORDERS ISSUED PURSUANT
TO CHAPTER 120, F.S., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, APRIL 1989 (March 1990).
115. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(5) (1989).
116. Reporter's Comments, supra note 25, at 14.
117. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(2) (1989) defines "agency action" to include "any denial of a request made under s. 120.54(5)." FLA. STAT. § 120.68(1) provides for judicial review of "final
agency action."
118. Levinson, supra note 2, at 631-34; FLA. STAT. § 120.54(10) (1989).
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or the Department of State through delegation," 9 could simplify the
indexing function by designing a uniform front page to be attached to
every adjudicative decision. The front page should have places for
names of the parties, docket number, statutory section number, rule
section number, perhaps key words pertaining to the subject matter,
and a symbol indicating whether the agency regards this as a precedent-setting decision.
If all front pages of agency orders were uniformly styled, they could
be computer processed. I envision a terminal in every county courthouse of the state where any lawyer, judge, or citizen has access to the
index that would reveal, among other matters, the agency's own perception as to which of its prior orders were precedent-setting. All
other orders would be indexed as well, so people could check on the
agency and challenge the agency's characterization of an order.
If the index were readily available along the lines I have suggested,
or by some other means, agencies would be more effectively encouraged to stay within their own precedents. Amending the Equal Access
to Justice Act 120 to provide attorney's fees and costs to parties who
maintain actions against agencies that depart from adjudicated precedent without explanation also may be appropriate.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The 1974 Florida APA was innovative and complicated at the time
of its enactment. Its provisions on rule review may have been too
cumbersome from the very beginning. The system may not be able to
survive significant increases in the total number of rulemaking proceedings or in the number of those proceedings that turn into formal
hearings as a result of the draw-out. These practical considerations
must be weighed against any advantages that are claimed by pending
proposals calling for the adoption of amendments that would require
rulemaking or for reinterpretations that would expand the availability
of the draw-out.
Practical considerations also are relevant with regard to the APA
requirement of a subject matter index of orders. The excuse for the
widespread violation of this requirement seems to be that compliance
is and always has been impractical. This excuse may have had some
validity in 1974, but it is much weaker today in view of technological
advances that make compliance much more feasible now than it was
then.

119.
(1989).
120.

The Department of State is already responsible for publishing rules, FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 57.111 (1989); see also Fla. H.B. 2539, § 3 (1990).

§

120.55
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Even though compliance with the indexing requirement may still be
burdensome, agencies should make renewed efforts to comply, and
individuals who need access to the index should renew their efforts to
make sure the agencies comply. The subject matter index was a crucial
feature of the 1974 APA. The intent was to contribute significantly to
the fairness of agency adjudication by establishing a type of administrative stare decisis. The judicial review provisions of the APA cannot
be fully effective unless the agencies comply with the indexing requirement. Agencies should not continue to frustrate the clear intent of the
APA unless compliance is absolutely impossible.

